Unit C 19: Terrorism

1.   Summary

Terrorism and democracy are opposites in dealing with political conflict. Terrorism relies on violence, democracy on legitimacy. In order to counter the threat of terrorism by democratic means, an adequate understanding of what terrorism is and what its background is is needed. At the same time, terrorism has changed in recent years - and that requires new responses.

2.   Terrorism

The purpose of terrorism is to generate fear, or rather intense fear. However, terrorism is also a clearly deliberate act, to be clearly distinguished from random violence (cf. Hunter 2012:200). Yes, one could say: terrorism is intentional communication about and with violence. Terrorist violence aims to say to the enemy: you are nowhere safe from us. At the same time, terrorist violence is meant to make the opponent fight back and expose himself- or better yet, throw his own, e.g. democratic, principles overboard. Terrorism is meant to "push state organs into certain reactions ..." (Föh 2011:59). The reaction to terror is supposed to confirm the terrorists' claim that the opponent is the real terrorist and give credibility to the terrorists. Seen in this light, liberal, democratic states would have to ask themselves whether, by increasing repression, launching military attacks against terrorist groups, and reducing the democratic rights of their citizens (surveillance), they are not doing exactly what the terrorists want: playing along with the game the terrorists want.

The Terrorism Act 2000 defined terrorism in the U.S. as "the use of or threat of acts that (a) involves serious violence against a person or serious harm to property, places the life of a person in danger, creates serious risks to the health or safety of the public or an area of the public ..., (b) seeks to influence the government or an international governmental organization or intimidates the public or a segment thereof, and (c) has political, religious, ethnic, or ideological objectives" (quoted from Staniforth 2014:34).

In doing so, Staniforth (2014:43) distinguished the following types of terrorism:

- Political terrorism,

- religious terrorism,

- ideological terrorism,

- nationalist terrorism,

- state-sponsored terrorism, and

- individual terrorist concerns or targets ("single issue" terrorism, i.e., terrorism against a specific policy, practice, or procedure).

However, terrorism is not a new phenomenon (see Föh 2011:59 and Staniforth 2014:33), but has existed throughout history.

Ted Honderich (2010:112-114) has formulated five provocative theses about terrorism:

1. Terrorism is destructive use of force in the form of killing, maiming, and destruction.

2. terrorism means "use of violence on a smaller scale" compared to war.

3. terrorism serves a political purpose "and thus also a further goal of a people, inadequately described as a social goal" (Honderich 2010:112). Unlike criminal behavior, according to Honderich 2010:112, terrorism does not serve personal gain or satisfaction.

4. terrorism is "a form of violence that violates national and international law" (Honderich 2010:113). According to Honderich (2010:113), "certain acts of a nation that might be called just war ... do not belong to it."

5. in the case of terrorism, the question is "whether it is unjust and not justified" (Honderich 2010:113). According to Honderich (2010:113), terrorism is "prima facie a wrong ... which is evident from the fact that it involves killing and maiming and ruining the lives of others" (Honderich 2010:113/114).

Despite all the problems with these theses - which are certainly debatable in part - one thing emerges clearly: Whether an act of violence is described as terrorism or as a "legitimate but violent liberation struggle" depends on the viewpoint of the observer. In both cases, political goals are pursued through the use of violence. As a difference, one could formulate that the liberation struggle places the extent and type of violence used in a more direct relationship

to its political goals (functional violence), while terrorism manages its violent action primarily through the media, which is why terrorist violence tends to escalate more and more ("the more brutal the act of violence, the more extensive the media attention"). Terrorism tends to create and intend a general climate of fear, anxiety and terror ("terror"), whereas a violent struggle or liberation struggle tends to pursue political goals and uses violence as a means to an end. In contrast, in terrorism, violence itself often becomes the end. However, these boundaries can become blurred.

Michael Walzer (2014:156-161) has given four excuses for terrorism, but all of them are false (Walzer 2014:159): the first excuse given for terrorism is that it is the last resort to act when all other means have failed. The second excuse describes terrorism as a national liberation movement fighting against strong and powerful states. The third excuse is simply that terrorism works. The fourth excuse is that ultimately all politics is terrorist.

Undoubtedly, Walzer can be agreed that all four arguments are based on a similar problem: they are seen as a violent continuation of rational politics -and that all four arguments are unacceptable. In the first argument, total destruction of social structure and society is accepted (total fear leads to anomie). However, Walzer would then have to explain what the victims can do -instead of violence- in a hopeless situation (e.g., in a genocide, in a situation of arbitrary violence -e.g., in a dictatorship, in a total marginalization of a population group, etc.). The second argument overlooks the fact that national liberation movements always focus on their political goal, which is to be achieved with minimal violence, but not with potentially unlimited violence - thus terror can be rudimentarily distinguished from a violent but legitimate struggle (see above). Strictly speaking, the third argument is not an argument, but only a statement: everything that is possible is done at some point. But this does not justify or even justify terrorist action. And the fourth argument lets the word "terrorism" degenerate to an empty phrase, i.e. all (political) action is ultimately seen as terrorist. And this is simply wrong.

Despite all the different assessments and understandings of terrorism, there is essentially agreement that **terrorism cannot be accepted under any circumstances from the**

perspective of the liberal and democratic constitutional state, but also **from the perspective of human rights**.

Views differ widely on how best to combat terrorism. Many people - and in their wake many politicians who exploit these sentiments - see the only response to terror as force in the form of police repression, military counterstrikes, and security measures that restrict the rights of individual citizens, such as surveillance of public and private space (the Internet!), preventive arrest and deportation of alleged or actual jihadists, etc. In this context, one must ask whether the use of predominantly or exclusively military means against terror - or indeed the "war on terrorism" (Gresh in Le Monde Diplomatique, April 2015:7) - has actually been a success in the 20th and 21st centuries. According to the Global Terrorism Database of the University of Maryland, between 2007 and 2010, around 200 attacks were carried out per year. In 2013, there were already three times more, 600 attacks, and in 2014 there were certainly likely many more (see Gresh in Le Monde Diplomatique, April 2015:7). For example, in 2014/2015, "Islamic State" and other jihadist organizations were joined by an estimated 20,000 foreign fighters, including 3400 Europeans.

The fact that terrorism does not (yet) constitute a war - despite war rhetoric to the contrary, such as after 9/11 by NATO and the United Nations, which spoke of a war of aggression against the United States in this context - is demonstrated, among other things, by the fact that terrorists were not and are not considered prisoners of war, as was the case with 9/11. Thus, the U.S. did not and still does not treat terrorists as prisoners of war or as ordinary criminals (see Jahn 2012:35). Even worse, countries that see themselves as states under the rule of law, such as the U.S., create a lawless space for the treatment - and mistreatment! - of terrorists, such as the Guantanamo detention center or the CIA's illegal prisons outside the USA. In doing so, they are attacking the very basis of fundamental rights on which they themselves are founded! They do thereby exactly what the terrorists want.

Thus, while the governments concerned deny the terrorists their legitimacy, they drive the terrorists, who not infrequently have some credibility and support among individual segments of the population, further into illegality and uncontrolled violence. For example, the undoubtedly terrorist Islamic State (IS) had relatively great legitimacy among the Sunni

population in Iraq, and Nigeria's Boko Haram could not have existed without some support among segments of the Islamic population in northern Nigeria. This is also consistent with statements by groups like the Islamic State, which proudly emphasize that - unlike the suicide bombers - the majority of their fighters come from the local population (cf. Weisflog in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 21.8.2015:3).

Undoubtedly, Kippenberg (2008:54) is correct in suggesting that by qualifying armed religious extremists as "terrorists" or "holy warriors," both sides are attempting to decide the legitimacy of such groups. Kippenberg (2008:54) concludes that "the terms and qualifications created in the process are not a solution, however, but part of the problem."

In this context, the nature of terrorism is multi-layered. Commenting on this problem, Jahn (2012:35) wrote: "Transnational terrorism contains features of political crime (such as assassinations, political murders), of an internationalized civil war, and also of an interstate war."

Accordingly, it is difficult to attribute the various waves and actor groups of terrorism to a common, universal cause. For example, while Western European terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s in Germany (Bader-Meinhof) and in Italy (Brigate Rosse, etc.) had its roots in the 1968 protest movement (cf. Eckert 2012:232), the causes of Islamic terrorism-such as Al Qaeda or IS-lay elsewhere. However, both were directed against social injustice, against U.S. imperialism, and both were - as Eckert (2012:264) emphasizes - a consequence of experienced violence. Therefore, Eckert (2012:264) concludes, "Violence must - technically speaking - be treated not only as a dependent variable, but also as an independent variable, especially if conditions of persistence and radicalization are to be explained. Experiences of violence 'have an effect' - and the experience, accounts, and imagination of such experiences is a central element of both personal biographies and political processes." In the self-image of terrorist groups, their actions were a consequence of the "emergence of solidarity collectives in the [disadvantaged, note CJ] populations for whom the fighters believed they were acting."

However, there is always an (individual)psychological side as well. Friedmann Eissler (in Materialdienst EZW 3/2017:85) has pointed out that every young person has to perform four central coping achievements during adolescence: first, the experience and elaboration of self-worth; second, a successful search for a supporting social orientation; third, a successful organization of social support; and fourth, successful social integration. These important, biographical achievements are contrasted by four "risky framework conditions." First, personal disregard, experienced humiliation or parental indifference; second, orientation conflicts between authoritarian-patriarchal value concepts (e.g., preservation of family honor) and individualized, self-responsible models of self-determination; third, deficient experiences, e.g., at school and low social status, up to - fourth - experiences of discrimination by Islamophobic or xenophobic attitudes in the social environment. In this context, jihadist or Salafist ideologies offer themselves as counter-designs. Eissler (in Materialdienst EZW 3/2017:87) rightly points out the ambivalent role of religion: "No one radicalizes on **because of religion**, but in the radicalization process Islam is then the "top issue". The jihadist understanding of Islam serves as both a catalyst and a compensatory instrument. Ideological content is interchangeable and a question of the current zeitgeist - for example, the German RAF terrorists espoused a Marxist ideology.

In his master's thesis in 2017, Florent Biellmann, an analyst at the Fedpol, investigated the motivation that drives young Muslims to join jihadist groups such as the Islamic State (IS). He examined the biographies of nine men and one woman, all Swiss citizens - including four dual nationals - half from German-speaking Switzerland and half from French-speaking Switzerland, who traveled to IS territory to take part in the fight. The backgrounds of the individuals studied were characterized by disruptions, such as divorce, deaths in the family, or traumatic experiences. Schooling was minimal for all of them, and nine of the ten studied had been unemployed for a long time before traveling to the jihad. Biellmann concluded that the motivation for travel for many, if not most, was to draw a line under their previous lives and difficulties at home. In addition, there was a romanticized view of the caliphate, naiveté and credulity (see Gyr in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 12.6.2017:9). The Internet played a decisive role in radicalization. Although mosques also served as social meeting places, Biellmann believes that those responsible in Swiss mosques do try to dissuade potential jihadist travelers from their plans. Many of the young people are looking for answers. For example,

one converted to Catholicism before turning to Islam, and another had previously been an active right-wing extremist (see Gyr in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 12.6.2017:9).

Undoubtedly, Beyer's (2008:69 and 71) observation that terrorism after World War II and in the 1970s - e.g., of ETA, the IRA, or the PLO - was to a large extent ethnic-national in character and usually focused on a specific country is fundamentally true. In contrast, "transnational terrorism" or the "new terrorism" in the wake of 9/11 had an international character and operated much more globally than before.

Kai Hirschmann (2001) has distinguished four types of possible motives for terrorist activity:

- Aspirations for revolutionary changes in political and social structures, often accompanied by ideological goals and in opposition to the dominant ideology;
- the need of ethnic or political minorities and oppressed groups to fight for an improvement of their status, e.g., for a separate state or political and cultural autonomy;
- religious or pseudo-religious motives; and
- mental disorders of individual wrongdoers.

2.1   Religious terrorism

Hans G. Kippenberg (2008:53) has pointed out that until the late 1970s, depending on one's point of view, armed fighters were called terrorists by some and freedom fighters by others. According to Kippenberg (2008:53), the attitude toward terrorism has changed massively since then, especially in the case of religiously motivated terror: terrorists are not fighters for justice, but criminals who condone innocent victims and kill people out of gratuitous hatred. It should be countered, however, that it is precisely the continuing popularity of Islamist assassins in many Islamic countries - such as Pakistan, the Gaza Strip, Iran and Afghanistan - that shows that it is not the ambivalent perception of terrorists that has shifted, but rather that today only the West and its allied governments have increasingly come to regard Muslim perpetrators of violence as illegitimate, criminal users of violence, whereas in the 1960s and 1970s guerrillas and rebels also enjoyed considerable sympathy in the West. Or, to put it another way, sympathy for Muslim users of violence has shifted to fringe Muslim

immigration in the West and to disadvantaged groups in Muslim countries-but it persists, as evidenced by the unabated recruiting power of these groups. In addition, as a result of media globalization, terrorism is much more present in the media, which is why it can easily be instrumentalized for political goals - on both sides! And this is all the more true since jihadist terrorism has been and is being carried more and more into non-Islamic countries since 9/11.

The globalization of (Islamist) terrorism is also reflected in the fact that the composition of suicide bombers is becoming increasingly international. Eyewitnesses - such as arrested suicide bombers - or even the University of Chicago's database on suicide bombings in Syria agree that there is a foreigner rate of 80-90 percent among the bombers: There were about 300 suicide bombings in Syria in 2013. Although the origin of the attackers remained uncertain in many cases, it is known that in the 31 attacks from May to July 2014, the perpetrators were from Arab countries in 21 cases and from Western countries in 4 cases (cf. Weisflog in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Aug. 21, 2015:3). In 2007, during a raid near the Iraqi city of Sinjar, the Americans got their hands on personnel data of 700 foreign al-Qaeda fighters. Of these, about 50% were from Saudi Arabia and 20% from Libya. Of the al-Qaeda fighters designated for suicide attacks, the highest percentages came from Libya, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia (see Weisflog in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Aug. 21, 2015:3). According to the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point, foreign fighters recruited via the Internet - i.e. anonymously - are the "most reliable" suicide bombers; conversely, the probability of ending up as a suicide bomber is significantly lower for fighters recruited through relatives (cf. Weisflog in Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 21.8.2015:3). One reason for this is likely to be that jihadists recruited via the Internet are significantly more ideologically motivated than fighters with personal connections among the jihadists.

Anton A. Bucher (2011:54) has pointed out that the common stereotype of religious suicide perpetrators depicts people who feel they have nothing left to lose and who, in their hopeless desperation, try to drag as many people of other faiths to their deaths as possible. These perpetrators are marked by experiences of deprivation and are often mentally ill, paranoid or psychotic. However, studies carried out in various countries - for example, in Palestine and Sri Lanka (cf. Merari 2002) - have shown that the suicide perpetrators hardly

differed from the majority population: "They were neither more introverted, nor more melancholic, nor more depressed, nor did they show any notable psychotic traits, had not used drugs, or had already attempted suicide once. Their average age was 24 years. Almost all were single and not in a committed relationship. Most had no evidence of socially dysfunctional attributes, such as growing up without a father, having few or no friends, and no job. Most were psychologically inconspicuous, healthy, and socially well integrated" (Bucher 2011:55).

Bucher's conclusion: "Most [suicide bombers, note CJ] are intelligent, socially well integrated in their groups, neither depressed nor neurotic, deeply religious - and the majority male" (Bucher 2011:61). Religious suicide bombers are no more criminal than other people. Other studies of individuals who trained as suicide bombers also found no signs of psychopathology; most came from wealthy families, were well educated, and were very highly regarded socially (Bucher 2011:56). The only outstanding characteristic was an unshakable religious conviction. In addition, in most cases there was a high additional gain of prestige in their own group, in which the suicide bombers were generally very well integrated. This is consistent with Eckert's (2012: 161), according to which many Muslims - Eckert speaks of 80 to 90% - suffer from a kind of "collective, fraternal deprivation," i.e., a kind of collective traumatization, because they understood violent actions by Western states against Muslim countries - as in the example of Afghanistan or Iraq - as a collective attack on "the Muslims," which is why a political-religious legitimization of violence has certainly occurred even among personally well-integrated Muslims, without, however, leading to violent actions in every case.

The psychotherapist Khalid Sohail described a typical developmental sequence of Muslim suicide perpetrators: As a rule, the process begins with a strong identification with their religion, which is usually stronger than the identification with the home country. This is accompanied by a strong empathy with all Muslims, especially those killed and persecuted. At the same time, there is a growing hatred of the West, especially the United States, which justifies its actions with democratic freedoms but acts primarily out of economic interests (oil!). There is a process of "dehumanization" of the Americans. Often, family members are also victims of violence (cf. Sohail, quoted from Bucher 2011:58).

The following account of two female religious terrorists shows how assassins cut themselves off from their feelings, as it were, and focus on a level of convention; Collins refers to the assassins as having a "poker face."

"The 18-year-old [assassin, note CJ] was talking to her fiancé the night before the attack about how they would get married the next summer once she graduated from high school. The next morning, she sets out to meet the driver who will take her to the Israeli supermarket where she will detonate her bomb. When she meets a classmate, she just says 'hello' and continues walking. The driver says she chatted with him in the car and seemed quite calm, even though there was a bomb in the bag at her feet. Five minutes before he let her out, the driver asked if she wanted to back out. She said no, she was not afraid, she wanted to kill people and she was ready to die. A few minutes later, her bomb had killed herself, a young Israeli woman and a security guard. A third female suicide bomber, interviewed by a journalist before the attack, said, 'You don't think about the explosive belt or how your own body will be shredded.' The journalist wrote that she seemed nervous about the interview but joked and giggled with two Palestinian women who greeted her as she came in" (Collins 2011:671). Terrorist organizations specifically sought out quiet, mature personalities; both Palestinian organizations and al-Qaeda rejected many applicants (cf. Collins 2011:671).

Collins (2011:673) points out that close-ups of photographed or filmed assassins before the attack showed little emotion, neither fear nor determination. In isolated cases, there was a put-on smile or a slightly raised eyebrow, a small sign of fear. Otherwise, the faces were expressionless and blank (cf. Collins 2011:673).

Claudia Brunner (2011:59) explicitly answered the question of whether there can or should be feminist terrorism research in the negative: because terrorism research as a whole is a "politically close and masculinized field, it is difficult to locate feminist and postcolonial research in it" (Brunner 20011:60). Feminist research cannot stop at the research object of "terrorism" because of a broader concept of violence that also includes structural violence. Rather, feminist research must address the "premises and conditions of possibility" on the basis of which political violence is exercised and defined (cf. Brunner 2011:60). But against

this - exceedingly weak argument - it must be objected that feminist research in particular would have an important contribution to make to the phenomenon of terrorism, especially in light of the fact that in recent years and in some places - e.g., the Northern Caucasus and Palestine - female terrorists have become increasingly important after the assassins were exclusively male for a long time. What determinants have brought about these shifts? Is it an expression, albeit a perverse one, of the breaking through of traditional male and female roles, a kind of perverse emancipation, so to speak, or what are the reasons? What does this development mean for the difference-theoretical approach, what for the deconstruction of masculinity and femininity?

2.2 Recent developments in terrorist movements

Bruno Lezzi (in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 14.10.2014:6) has pointed out that the latest forms of religious terrorism are characterized, among other things, by the fact that nation-state borders are hardly respected and certainly no longer accepted, that the terrorists have at their disposal the most modern military arsenal - such as the IS in Syria and Iraq - that they make use of high-tech means of communication, act in an extremely mobile manner and rely on social networks. At the same time, there are hardly any terror centers or headquarters left, or if there are, they are extremely mobile. In other words, terrorism has become transnational, virtual and media-based - and terrorists have local chunks or even territories in many places, such as Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, northeastern Nigeria, Central Africa, the Maghreb states and Libya.

Their resources have grown accordingly, fed by taxes on the controlled population, the sale of raw materials (oil, natural gas, etc.), and simply robbery and extortion (e.g., ransoms for hostages). From this point of view, it can be said that terrorism has reached a new level and quality since the year 2000. The times when terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda had to hide in mountain caves in Afghanistan are probably definitely over.

But is it right to speak of a global war of terror today? After the bloody terrorist attack in Paris in November 2015, Wolfgang Sofsky wrote (in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 16.11.2015:10): "With the attacks in Paris, the terror war has advanced to the capital of the continent. In the

Middle East and in some regions of Asia and Africa, this war is chronic; in Europe, so far, it is still an episode. Nevertheless, it was a war attack. As such, it was planned and commissioned. The French government immediately understood the situation. Terror war is a form of war of its own kind. It is fundamentally different from the old familiar terrorism and from the war of nation-states."

A war is characterized by the fact that the armed conflict is fought in order to achieve very specific economic or political goals. But what are the goals of the so-called "Islamic State" (IS)? Neither the annihilation of non-Muslims or Muslims with deviant beliefs nor the destruction of Western states can be a realistic war goal. Surely the implementation of an Islamist world government can hardly be a goal of the jihadists either? Are, then, the war aims of the jihadist terrorist movements of a purely local nature? That, too, seems questionable, since neither al-Qaeda nor IS systematically targets Arab governments - not even the Assad regime in Syria or the government in Iraq appear to be primary IS targets. So what are the jihadists aiming for? Can their terror - undoubtedly extremely brutal - really be understood as "war"? A war against the combined military power of the large states of the USA, France, Great Britain and Russia, which they cannot win?

That the recent jihadist terror in many European countries, such as the UK, France, Germany and Belgium since 2014, can indeed according to Strenger (in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 27.7.2016:11) be understood as a "war of terror", is supported by the fact that there is apparently a clear strategic goal of IS terrorism: "The organization wants to cut the Islamic world off completely from the West. Its ideology states that the area in which Islam interacts with other cultures must be erased." In my opinion, however, it is more likely that the jihadist strategists do not want to cut off the Islamic world from the West, but a) want to force the Western (and post-Eastern) democracies to destroy their liberal and human rights-based basic order by systematically restricting fundamental rights through massive security and repressive measures, and b) want to install an arbitrary Islamist regime in as many countries as possible.

This view is also supported by the fact that countries with religious peace and intercultural and interreligious tolerance are being targeted. For example, on January 29, 2017, a terrorist

attack was carried out on the mosque in Quebec City, killing six people and injuring 19. In previous years, there had already been xenophobic and Islamist attacks on mosques in Quebec and Ontario (see Wieser in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Jan. 31, 2017b:7). It is of secondary importance whether the attacks were committed by Islamophobic or jihadist terrorists - all have the same strategic goal: the destruction of religious peace, provocation of feelings of hatred and fear. In the process, Canada had taken in 40,000 Syrian refugees between the fall of 2015 and January 2017, one of the highest contingents since World War II (see Mijnssen and Wenger in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Jan. 31, 2017a:7).

Therefore, all democratic states and forces must do their utmost to prevent democratic freedoms and fundamental rights from being sacrificed on the altar of repressive anti-terror policies - otherwise the terrorists will achieve exactly what these repressive measures aim to prevent: The destruction of the state and democracy.

One thing seems clear, however: If one wants to defeat jihadism, one must win over its social base. In Sofsky's opinion (in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 16.11.2015:10), the so-called "Islamic State" is "... far more than a militant militia. It is a parastatal theocracy with social welfare, a tax system, draconian indoctrination, sexual slavery, a secret service, regular army units and international brigades of terrorist warriors". Thus, on the one hand, the "Islamic State" lives off local resources - such as the sale of oil, the hawking of cultural goods and local taxes - on the other hand, as an international movement, it attracts thousands of young Muslims from all over the world, and its appeal among Islamic youth hardly seems to diminish. In November 2015, the Neue Zürcher Zeitung (of Nov. 17, 2015:4) estimated the total number of IS foreign fighters at 21,000, with the majority coming from African and European countries. Other sources put the figure at 35,000 fighters (Shatz in Le Monde Diplomatique, December 2015a:1). This means that Western states must return to their secular community of values and their humanist foundation and aggressively represent both. A dual strategy is needed: On the one hand, it is necessary to win over youth throughout the world for democracy, humanity, human rights and freedom - and for a model of peaceful coexistence of secular state and religion.

On the other hand, the local social base of the terrorist movements must be won over for social democracy, freedom and political participation. In concrete terms, this means: adequate participation in government by the Sunni minority in Iraq, overthrow of the Assad regime in Syria and formation of a broad government supported by all population groups, establishment of democratic state structures in Somalia and ending the civil war in Yemen.

2.3   On the financing of terrorism

The example of terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda and the "Islamic State" (IS) can be used to show how important the issue of financing is for such organizations. Tom Keatings (in Schweizerische Handelszeitung, 9.10.2014:18) estimated in 2014 that IS had an annual budget of around $1-2 billion, while Al-Qaeda never had more than $30 million per year. Ibrahim Warde (in Le Monde Diplomatique, December 2015b:9) estimated in late 2015 that IS's income from oil exports, smuggling, taxes, road tariffs, and various forms of extortion was $2 billion per year. It should be borne in mind that at that time Daesh (= Islamic State) controlled an area half the size of France and a population of around 10 million (Warde in Le Monde Diplomatique, December 2015b:9). In the process, IS systematically created state structures. In November 2015, for example, the self-proclaimed caliphate even began minting its own money coins: the "Islamic dinar" made of gold and the "Islamic dirham" made of silver (Warde in Le Monde Diplomatique, December 2015b:9).

It is likely that the IS was only able to become so strong because it systematically captured sources of raw materials and sold the raw materials - such as oil. In addition, the IS took and takes millions with the sale of cultural artifacts rejected by it as anti-Islamic, which is organized by private individuals, but for which the IS meticulously collects taxes based on detailed accounting (cf. Szpiro in Neue Zürcher Zeitung of December 3, 2015b:8). Many terrorist organizations - such as the Shabab militia in Somalia - procured a quasi-state function and collected taxes, the IS among others from "infidels" in the sense of the traditional "dhimmi" statute. In Iraq, it has been estimated, the "Islamic State" generates about 60% of its revenue from oil smuggling (see Rogg in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Nov. 18, 2015a:5). In Syria, IS captured oil wells, smuggled the crude oil to Turkey, from where it was in turn sold to refineries controlled by the Assad regime (cf. Keatings in Schweizerische

Handelszeitung of 9.10.2014:18). The local and supra-regional oil trade of the IS is helped by the fact that there is a great shortage of fuel in civil war-torn Syria, which is why rebel groups hostile to the IS and even the regime also buy oil from the IS (Bischoff in Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 3.12.2015a:8). A drying up of these oil supplies would be fatal: "If the supplies from the IS areas were to dry up, this would have serious consequences for the entire war-ravaged country: transports of food and other essential goods, the operation of generators or heaters would become unaffordable, and the hardship of the population would become even greater" (Bischoff in Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 3.12.2015a:8).

Other sources of terrorist funding - in North Africa, for example - were and are hostage-taking and the ransoms extorted from them.

However, the Islamic State generated the lion's share of its income through local taxes. For example, truck drivers had to pay a fee of $200 to $500 per transport, and IS also levied taxes on all those who received their wages from the central state in Iraq and Syria (cf. Rogg in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 18.11.2015a:5). According to documents from IS areas, 28% of revenues in 2015 came from oil and gas, 24% of revenues came from tax revenues, and the lion's share of revenues came from confiscated real estate and other valuables (cf. Rogg in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 18.11.2015a:5). Donations from wealthy Muslims were of rather little significance.

Conversely, the question also arises as to what costs arise from the fight against terrorism. A study by the U.S. Congressional Research Service estimated the cost of additional federal personnel after 9/11, as well as the cost of war in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere, at a total of $1.6 trillion (see Lanz in Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 28.11.2015:31). For comparison: this is exactly as much as all countries in the world spent on armaments in 2015 (cf. SIPRI 2016). The additional security measures - for example at airports, the additional waiting times, etc. - also had a financial impact. For example, the Rand Coorporation in the USA estimated these costs at 9.4 billion US dollars for the year 2004 alone (cf. Lanz in Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 28.11.2015:31).

If one considers the dimensions and the extent of all these costs, it no longer seems so absurd to speak of a global war on terrorism.

2.4   Media and Terrorism

Hans-Georg Soeffner (2010:53) has called the interaction of media and terrorism a "sacred alliance," whereby today the "old" media (print, telephone, telegraph, radio, and film) and the new media (television and the Internet) have "technically and organizationally grown together into a...globalized media network" (Soeffner 2010:55). This media network is characterized by its global presence, in three ways: simultaneous presence, simultaneous accessibility, and simultaneous availability. For terrorism, the media are indispensable: "Differences in media distribution density make attractive for terrorists those regions in which technical infrastructure, media presence, and accessibility of an audience are most effectively related. Here, both the fastest media response and the seemingly most immediate perception and dissemination of media-figured horror can be simulated. The attack of September 11, 2001, makes this connection particularly clear. The World Trade Center, symbol of the 'Western'-dominated economic system, combined all of the previously mentioned structural features in an almost ideal way" (Soeffner 2010:55/56). Thereby, "this media-generated and supported collectivization of emotions among a - tendentially - de-territorialized audience ... forms the structural basis for the attempt of individual persons or groups to choose the 'outrageous' act as a starting point and as an occasion for a charismatization of the perpetrators, their (leader) or a group or 'social movement'" (Soeffner 2010:57).

2.5   How should the state deal with radicalization processes and terrorist violence?

The jurist Markus Mohler (in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 12.1.2017:12) has pointed out that, according to existing Swiss law, for terrorist violence to be punishable, at least the first step of an attempt to commit a crime must have taken place. However, the Swiss Criminal Code (SCC) already criminalizes preparatory acts related to proliferation of radioactive materials and concerning murder, grievous bodily harm, arson, etc.), as well as certain conduct related to support for terrorism. In addition, the Federal Law on the Prohibition of the Groups al-

Qaeda, IS and similar organizations punishes membership and any form of financing of these organizations (cf. Mohler in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Jan. 12, 2017:12).

Currently, three approaches to detention in relation to terrorism are being discussed in politics: First, as a new criminal offense, support for terrorism; second, preventive detention for those at risk; and third, detention by a criminal court (cf. Mohler in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 12.1.2017:12). So far, mandatory reporting and electronic restraints have not proven successful.

However, it must be avoided that in the context of the fight against terrorism, the very fundamental rights that one wants to protect against terrorism are abolished. Restrictions of fundamental rights in the context of counterterrorism must (1) be proportionate, (2) the duration of the restriction of fundamental rights - for example by deprivation of liberty - must be limited in time, or (3) a lifelong detention must be reviewed regularly (cf. Mohler in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 12.1.2017:12).

Eckert (2012:274/275) suggests the following minimal requirements:

- Different affiliations are to be respected. Forced assimilation usually leads to the radicalization of the deviant identity (example: Kurds who were to be assimilated as "Mountain Turks").

- The essentialization of self-attributions and attributions to others ("the" Islam, "the" Leitkultur) must be criticized in order to make it more difficult to form prejudices. However, constitutional principles must be enforced without compromise.

- Even initially revolutionary-minded or foreign groups can "immigrate" to the constitutional state, as the 68ers showed. This path should not be obstructed by ultra-stable labels as "anti-constitutional". Even a "defensible democracy" can be sensitive.

- Possible deprivatization perceptions (e.g., inequality in the recognition of religious symbols) must be considered and overcome. Religious symbols are to be respected in general.

- Nonviolent demonstration techniques are to be recognized. Recruitment channels for violent solidarity, e.g. on the Internet, are to be controlled (with the reservation of judges).

- If violence is the cause of violence, preventing danger in a constitutional state means both preventing violence (on the other side) and avoiding violence (on one's own side).

- Security and human rights promises must be kept. There can be no criminal law against the enemy.

- Reconciliation policy has a chance as soon as there is a stalemate or a breathing space in violent conflicts (Source: Eckert 2012:274/275).

But hasn't reality long since overtaken these well-meaning proposals? Worldwide, jihadist groups are running smear campaigns - and not only in Arabic and English, but already in Russian, French and German - calling on Muslims working in Western countries to "hijra" (= move, in reference to Mohammed's "hijra" from Mecca to Medina in 622, which is considered the beginning of the Muslim calendar) to the "Islamic State" if they wanted to survive. Jihadist terrorists meticulously document individual - but by no means all - their atrocities with video footage of beheadings, dead children and mass executions (cf. Novak in Zentralschweiz am Sonntag, 29.9.2014:3).

The connection between causes of terrorism and the way they are fought has been presented by D'Anieri (2014:9) as follows:

Question:

Answer:

Policy
/Strategy:

```
                         ┌──────────────────┐
                         │   What causes    │
                         │    terrorism?    │
                         └──────────────────┘
          ┌─────────────────────┼─────────────────────┐
    ┌───────────┐        ┌───────────────┐      ┌───────────────┐
    │  Poverty  │        │  Ideological  │      │ Authoritarian │
    │           │        │  extremism    │      │  Government   │
    └───────────┘        └───────────────┘      └───────────────┘
          │                      │                      │
          │            ┌──────────────────┐    ┌───────────────┐
          │            │ Use of "intelligence"│ │   Advance     │
    ┌───────────────┐  │ and "law         │    │ democratization│
    │ Driving economic│ │ enforcement" to  │    └───────────────┘
    │ development   │  │ identify extremists│
    └───────────────┘  └──────────────────┘
```

Source: D'Anieri 2014:9.

Interesting in this context is the response of probably the best-known Latin American economist, Hernando de Soto. He has put forward the thesis that the main reason for the success of IS and al-Qaeda jihadists in recruiting fighters in the countries of the Middle East and Africa is that many young people are excluded from the economy, are dependent on corrupt and arbitrary officials and live, as it were, as economic refugees in their own country: not a single suicide bomber cited religious or political reasons after his suicide attempt; most were small entrepreneurs in the informal sector. If these people could be given secure economic conditions and property, they would have the opportunity to move up into the middle class. That is why economic prospects are the most effective means of depriving terrorist groups of their social base, so to speak. This has already worked in Peru, where in the 1990s the Marxist land guerrilla Sendero Luminoso controlled 60% of the country. Thanks to de Soto's advice, Fujimori had succeeded in legalizing the status of coca farmers, recognizing and formalizing their property rights over their land, and thus decriminalizing them. As a result, the guerrillas had become increasingly isolated (cf. Busch in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 22.4.2015:26).


Staniforth (2014:84-86) has distinguished three types of responses to terrorism:

- Military response: fighting terrorists through armed force.

- Criminal justice prosecution: this, of course, depends on the effectiveness of existing law.

- Collective "community" response: integration, inclusion of existing groups, neighborhood security, and rejection of anti-social acts by terrorists.

In recent years - particularly under Obama's presidency from 2008 - 2016, there has been a massive increase in the use of armed drones against terrorists. For example, the New America Foundation counted 403 drone attacks against Pakistan between 2004 and the end of 2016, including 355 during Obama's administration (see Pabst in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Jan. 13, 2016:7). Thereby, the collateral damage, i.e.: the uninvolved persons killed during missions, is enormous: According to a report by the British NGO Reprieve, 1147 people died in drone attacks on 41 targets until 2014 (cf. Pabst in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 13.1.2016:7). In this context, the American government in particular considers men of fighting age in the vicinity of the targets as legitimate targets. Today, more than a few military experts are of the opinion that drone attacks on exponents of terrorist groups do more harm than good because the acceptance of civilian victims drives their relatives into the arms of the terrorists. Terrorist groups, as well as parties allied with them, try to capitalize on the victims of drone attacks - and to strengthen anti-Western resentment.

The so-called Contest Strategy takes the following approach to terrorism:

Source: Staniforth 2014:89.

The starting point is twofold: The risk posed by the actors (prevention and prosecution) and the vulnerability of the targets (protection and preparation).

An excellent response against terrorist developments is the mobilization of all groups and people who want to defend the democratic rights of all within the framework of the secular state. For example, after the attack against "Charlie Hebdo" in early 2015, more than a million people took part in a demonstration in Paris - probably the largest in decades - and more than 50 government leaders marched with them. In Berlin a little later, tens of thousands of people joined a demonstration for freedom and democracy against terrorism, and German President Gauck took the opportunity to explicitly praise the patriotism of the (moderate) Muslim associations, which backed German democracy without reservation.

An anti-terror convention has also been discussed in the UN for some time (cf. Föh 2011:414ff.). In March 2005, the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented a proposal to combat terrorism. This comprised five points (5-D):

- Dissuade: dissuade people from using or supporting terrorism;

- Deny: Deny terrorists access to funds and material resources;

- Deter: Deter states from supporting terrorism;

- Develop: build state capacity to combat terrorism; and

- Defend: defend human rights in the fight against terrorism (see Föh 2011:438).

During the General Debate of September 19-20, 2006, the UN General Assembly adopted a "Plan of Action" against terrorism that included four "pillars": **first, measures to eliminate conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism**; **second, measures to prevent and combat terrorism**; **third, measures to build the capacity of states**; and **fourth, measures to ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law** (cf. Föh 2011:443-448).

Under the impression of the Paris attacks in November 2015, Wolfgang von Erffa (in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 18.11.2015b:10) proposed three strategies in the fight against terrorism and especially against the Islamic State (IS):

1) Eliminating the causes of hatred and violence through justice as the basis of rule, international peace policy, and efforts to resolve local conflict, including in particular the Israel-Palestine conflict;

2)   Establishment of stable and just state authority in the conflict areas that takes into account the concerns of the population; and

3)   A kind of Marshall Plan for social and economic construction and improvement of living conditions in the affected regions.

2.6   The problem of returnees

The longer terrorist activities continue and the larger areas are temporarily under the control of terrorist organizations, the greater the problem of returnees of militant terrorists to their home states. Their numbers can run into the thousands in individual countries. For example, the Tunisian state counted exactly 2929 returning jihadists from combat zones at the beginning of 2017, but experts and international estimates put the number of Tunisian fighters with IS at at least 5,000 for Tunisia alone (see Steinich in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Jan. 20, 2017:7). By the beginning of 2017, 800 of these had returned to Tunisia from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. Tunisia puts returnees in the completely overcrowded prisons or places them under house arrest. In 2017, for example, around 1,700 of a total of 24,000 prisoners were charged with terror offenses (see Steinich in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Jan. 20, 2017:7).

The big question, of course, is what to do with such returnees. From locking them away to social integration, everything has been and is being tried.

Even countries that pride themselves on their guaranteed fundamental rights - such as Switzerland or Germany - are faced with the problem of what to do with returning fighters. Deportation to their home countries also does not work, or only to a limited extent, partly because quite a few jihadists have citizenship rights here.

Because many countries face the problem of returnees, it would make sense to coordinate their integration into local societies internationally - or at least to work out appropriate standards.

3. **Control Questions**

1. What is the purpose of terrorism?

2. State Honderich's five theses on terrorism.

3. What do terrorism and a "legitimate but violent liberation struggle" have in common?

4. How could terrorism be distinguished from a violent liberation struggle?

5. What four excuses for terrorism does Walzer give?

6. How did Jahn describe the connection between terrorism and crime?

7. According to Eckert, why must violence be considered an "independent variable" and how is this reflected in the biographies of perpetrators of violence?

8. What four types of possible motives of terrorists did Hirschmann distinguish?

9. In Kippenberg's opinion, to what extent has it not been the violence of Muslim terrorists that has changed, but their perception by the West?

10. Why is terrorism easier to instrumentalize for political goals today?

11. Why can we say that Müller's thesis that suicide bombers suffer from psychological deprivation is not true?

12. According to Ecker, why do quite a few Muslims support religious assassins, at least ideally?

13. How did the psychiatrist Sohail describe the typical radicalization of Muslim suicide bombers?

14. To what extent is the notion of mentally unstable assassins not true?

15. Why would feminist terrorism research in particular have a significant contribution to make today?

16. To what extent has terrorism reached a new level and quality since 2000?

17. What are the arguments for and against calling the current terrorism (2015) a "war of terror"?

18. How has the financial situation of Muslim terrorists developed in recent times?

19. What is the role of the media in relation to terrorism?

20. According to Mohler, what three conditions must restrictions on fundamental rights meet in the fight against terrorism?

21. What are the eight points Eckert proposed against radicalization and terrorist violence for state actors?

22. What strategy does Hernando de Soto recommend against religious terrorism?

23. What three types of responses to terrorism does Staniforth see?

24. To what extent do mobilizations (also) constitute a response to terrorist attacks?

25. What five points did Kofi Annan propose to combat terrorism?

26. What were the four pillars of the "plan of action" against terrorism adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2006?

27. What three strategies did Wolfgang von Erffa propose for the main areas affected by terrorist movements?

4. Links

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