Unit D 16: Nations and nation states

1.   Summary

Nation-states, as currently understood, are institutions that exercise state power over the population of a defined, limited territory. Nations are usually defined as ethnically homogeneous or heterogeneous populations living in one or more states. Common language, religion, or a shared history can, but need not, form the basis of nation-states. What is important is that the population identifies with "its" state.

2.   On the definition of the (nation) state

> "What makes a nation is its past, what justifies a nation against others is its past, and historians are the people who produce it."
> Source: Hobsbawm1992:3.

In the sense of the three-element doctrine developed by Georg Jellinek (1966:394ff.), "a politically and legally organized association of territories and persons is a state if there is an independent power assigned to a people and a delimited territory" (Leidenmühler 2011:82). In this context, **state power**, **state people** and **state territory** represent three interrelated indispensable elements of a state. This understanding of the state has been adopted verbatim in some textbooks on international law (cf. Leidenmühler 2011:83).

Jean L. Cohen (2012:80) has pointed out that multinational and multiethnic states are the norm today. Thus, the homogeneous nation-state - actually always a myth - has become an "anachronistic and destructive ideal".

According to Tobias Debiel (2005, cited in Werther-Pietsch/Ritzer 2012:40), there are six core functions of the state that serve to generate prosperity and dual legitimacy in the sense of politically responsible action and the principle of legality, as well as security. These six core state functions are

1.   security governance: ensuring collective and individual security;

2. political governance: political decision-making processes that are subject to horizontal and vertical power control;

3. judicial governance: institutionalized conflict resolution and enforcement of applicable law;

4. administrative governance: implementation and enforcement of legislative decisions that are bound by law, use public resources responsibly and are accountable to citizens;

5. social governance: basic social services and distributive justice;

6. economic governance: infrastructural and legal foundations for the development of economic activities (after Werther-Pietsch/Ritzer 2012:40, slightly edited by CJ).

2.1 On the emergence and development of nations and nation-states.

Note: Parts of this chapter are taken - slightly edited - from Jäggi 1993:25ff.

> "A nation ... is a group of people united by a common error concerning their ancestry and a common dislike of their neighbors!"
> Source: Deutsch1972a:9; quoted from Ludwig 1991:8.

Bernhard Perchinig (1988:43/44) rightly pointed out that the linking of state and nation by defining the nation through language was "a historical and by no means a quasi-natural phenomenon". According to the cultural anthropologist Emerich K. Francis (1976:34), an important condition for the emergence of a nation and a nation-state was the existence of a unifying and homogenizing central administration, which helped to create social units that were, so to speak, starting points for the nationalist movements.

In antiquity and the Middle Ages, nations did not yet exist in the modern sense. In the late Middle Ages and at the beginning of the modern era, the term **"nation"** was used to refer to regional origins, but without referring to language or ethnic commonality. In English, too, the term "nation" in the modern sense appeared relatively late. Originally, this term referred only to a collection of people from a certain place or simply to the totality of human or animal individuals (cf. Patterson 1977:67).

In the Middle Ages, ethnic distinctions between individual population groups, social classes, estates, and feudal lords were the rule. In church history, "nations" originally meant "associations representing countrymen, without reference to their nationality" (Kohn 1950:157). Thus, the participants in the Council of Constance from 1414 to 1417 were divided into four "nations," namely Germans, French, Italians, and English. The "Germans" included all the delegates of eastern Europe, that is, the Germans themselves, the Hungarians, and the Poles. The English block of delegates included all the northern European delegates, including the Scandinavians. This distinction by "nation" had already become apparent at the Councils of Lyons (1274) and Vienna (1311), when the monarchies sought to bring the Church in their territory under their political control. Because a vote by individual votes would have resulted in an overwhelming majority for the "Italian" Pope John XIII - the Italian bishops and abbots constituted by far the largest number of delegates - a voting mode by "nations" was introduced. However, both the cardinals' request to be allowed to vote as a fifth "nation" was rejected, as was King Sigmund's request to allow the Hungarian church leaders to vote as a separate "nation" (cf. Kohn 1950:158/159).

That is why, according to Friedrich Heckmann (1988:17), ideas of "nations" as "originally" ethnically homogeneous population groups are "part of the myth-making of nationalism," especially in the 18th, 19th, and early 20th centuries. "The political organizational form 'empire' was indifferent to the ethnic composition of its populations. The ruling elites of nobility and knighthood were international in their origins and also cultural orientation. Common identity among them was based on commonality of status, not ethnicity" (Heckmann 1988:17). Ladner (1991:6) also pointed out that the "elites in feudalism and the ancien regime ... [had] nothing in mind with the national idea. Their guiding ideas were the universalism of the 'empire' (church) and the **transpolitical commonality of the estate (nobility)**." Rather, it was in the interest of the ruling groups to emphasize the cultural differences to the "lower" groups. Social differentiations (estates!) were obviously more important than ethnic differences or commonalities.

The emerging nations and later nation-states were a step in a new phase of the development of larger and more homogeneous societies. The new sovereign territorial states were

characterized by the fact that they monopolized violence in the form of a permanent army and established a legal and administrative system valid for the entire national territory with a corresponding national bureaucracy. At the same time, "the population of the territorial states was ... culturally and linguistically heterogeneous; their affiliations and groupings did not follow cultural patterns, but were the result of the power politics of princes in the struggle to establish, consolidate, and expand territories" (Heckmann 1988:19).

At the beginning of the 19th century, a nation was considered to be "the ruling class through education and property" (Heckmann 1988:24). Obviously, in the course of the 19th century - among other things in view of the revolutionary liberal and social reform movements - the political elites of Europe felt compelled to increase their doubted legitimacy. A glorifying national myth was exceptionally well suited for this purpose. In various countries, such national myths boomed well into the 20th century. In 1991, for example, Switzerland, plagued by self-doubt and a deep national crisis, celebrated its - alleged - 700th anniversary, although the current form of the supposedly "oldest democracy in the world" is far younger and the 1291 Confederation referred only to a small part of today's Switzerland. Regardless of this, however, the history of the founding of the Confederation played an extremely central role in the civic thinking of the 19th and partly the 20th century of this country in the sense of an actual state myth.

Karl W. Deutsch (1972b:29) believed to detect a uniformity in the formation of nations. He named the following developmental steps:
- The transition from subsistence agriculture to a barter economy,
- the social mobilization of rural populations in areas of high settlement density and intensive exchange,
- the development of cities,
- the emergence of large-scale communication and transport networks,
- the gradual accumulation of capital,
- the formation of individual and particular interests,
- the awakening of ethnic consciousness and the spread of national symbols, and
- a fusion of ethnic consciousness and the exercise of political power.

Obviously, the importance of the emerging communication and transport networks in this context lay primarily in the fact that they laid the foundations for a common language. In contrast to other authors, Deutsch (1972b:35) warned against overestimating the economic preconditions for the development of nations. Thus, unifying economic factors did not lead to the formation of common nations if there were different views of life between two peoples.

In his theory of nationalism, the social anthropologist Ernst Gellner (1991:204) pointed to the increasing social division of labor and the associated need for precise and context-independent communication through abstract means of communication. Therefore, historically, only a large group of people who had a common culture - in the form of a highly developed written advanced culture - had a chance to modernize and stabilize their way of life in the longer term. This task had been fulfilled by nationalism or the nation-state. All the "characteristics imposed on the industrial order by its striving for growth and prosperity - mobility, communication, a certain minimum scale due to more developed specialization - commit its social units to size and at the same time to cultural homogeneity" (Gellner 1991:204/205). In order to become a modern industrial and communication society, it had needed the way over a written advanced culture. The access of all to writing and culture was also an indispensable prerequisite for the development of the modern nation-state. However, with Anderson (1988:53) the question must be asked here, why then not all population groups with the same language grew together **to a single nation and thus to a state**. In South America, for example, a whole series of nation states formed with the same - namely Spanish - official language. In Europe, Germany, German Austria, German Switzerland, Transylvania, Bohemia/Moravia and Liechtenstein formed their own states or became parts of multi-ethnic state structures. Nation, therefore, obviously has less to do with a unified language than with regionally limited socio-cultural and political conditions and commonalities or differences. Anthony D. Smith (1981:49) also argued that social communication tended to reinforce pre-existing trends and situations rather than produce new ethnic entities or state structures - e.g., nations or nation-states. Not infrequently, "national movements" were opposed by "anti-national forces" that themselves embodied a transnational force - so to speak, as a variety of "internationalism": for example, according to the historian Urs Altermatt (1989:70), in the 19th century in Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands, national culture was Protestant-liberal in character, while it was contrasted by Catholicisms of a "regional" or "transnational" character: "The Latin mass language was merely

the most visible symbol of Catholic internationalism. Beyond that, a whole bundle of signs and rites connected Catholics across all national borders."

Furthermore, the question arises as to why by no means all scripturally literate advanced civilizations have given rise to ethnically defined nationalisms. For example, in many Muslim countries - Algeria, for example - nationalism developed precisely not out of the Islamic scriptural religion, but as a secular areligious movement strongly associated with Western thought in the 19th and 20th centuries. This was no doubt one of the reasons in the recent past why, for example, the Algerian nationalism of the FLN, which came to power in connection with the Algerian War of Independence, was able to hold on for a relatively short time. Gellner (1991:112) himself pointed out that there was no Algerian nation before the nationalist awakening in this century: "There had existed the much broader community of Islam, as well as a whole series of smaller and narrower communities, but nothing remotely resembling the inhabitants of the present national territory." **Obviously, then, nationalism is a product of Western occidental secularism (= separation of church and state), and not infrequently as a reaction to the economic and political expansion of European powers**.

Obviously, there is also **a random, even arbitrary and voluntaristic factor** in the emergence of nations and nation-states, but also in the formation of nationalist worldviews and ideologies. Thus, Benedict Anderson (1988:71), referring to the former European colonies and later nation-states in the Americas, emphasized, "Neither economic interests nor liberal thought could **by themselves** produce the kind or shape of **imagined community** to be defended against the encroachments of the mother countries; in other words, none of these factors provided the framework for a new [national, note CJ.] consciousness...." Another indication of the importance of the voluntarist factor in the formation of nations is the fact that in Latin America and in much of Africa, until the recent present, the spatial extent of nationalist movements coincided with the former boundaries of colonial administrative units.

In Palestine, Turkey and Egypt (Nasser), nationalism also developed as a secular movement, independent of or even in competition with traditional Islamic scriptural culture. Only in more recent times did Islamist forces assert themselves more strongly among the Palestinians, as well as in Turkey, although strong tensions remain today between these currents and the respective

nationalist forces - for example, between the secularist autonomy authorities on the West Bank and the Hamas movement in Gaza. "However strong the religious identification of Muslims with Islam may be, within the vast area where Islam borders on other religions, with the exception of the Iranian, there is apparently hardly any protonational or national movement that can be clearly identified by the badge of Islam" (Hobsbawm 1991:87). From today's perspective, however, one would have to object that jihadist movements such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria or the Shabab militias in Somalia could certainly be understood as a kind of "religious nationalism" or, better, "religious transnationalism.

In addition, as Hobsbawm (1991:84) notes, the world religions, not only by their origins but also by their very nature, have a universal claim and are therefore careful not to address ethnic-cultural, linguistic, political, ideological and other differences. As the example of the Roman Catholic Church shows, an increased admission of regional or national specificities - e.g. the celebration of the liturgy in the national language after the Second Vatican Council - was as a rule rather a concession to social developments and mostly connected with a weakening of the central hierarchy. Correspondingly, currents such as Opus Dei emphasized the cross-Roman element of Catholicism.

In the last 200 years, many new nation states emerged. A first wave of state foundations lasted in Europe until the 1920s:

Year of foundation	Foundations of states
1830	Greece
1831	Belgium
1861	Italy
1871	German Empire
1878	Romania, Serbia, Montenegro
1905	Norway
1908	Bulgaria
1913	Albania
1917	Finland
1918	Poland, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (since 1929: Yugoslavia)
1922	Ireland

Source: Alter 1985:100.

Since 1922, many new states have also been established in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific - some new states have also emerged in Latin America:

Year of foundation	Year of foundation
1922	Egypt
1932	Iraq, Saudi Arabia
1943	Lebanon
1944	Syria, Iceland
1946	Jordan, Philippines
1947	India, Pakistan
1948	Burma, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Israel, North Korea, South Korea
1949	Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia
1951	Libya
1956	Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia
1957	Ghana, Malaysia
1958	Guinea
1960	Cameroon, Senegal, Mali, Togo, Congo (Zaire), Madagascar, Somalia, Dahomey (Benin), Niger, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Cyprus, Gabon, Nigeria, Mauritania
1961	Sierra Leone, Kuwait, Tanganyika (since 1964: Tanzania)
1962	Western Samoa, Burundi, Rwanda, Algeria, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda
1963	Kenya, Singapore
1964	Malawi, Malta, Zambia
1965	Gambia, Maldives
1966	Guyana, Botswana, Lesotho, Barbados
1968	Nauru, Mauritius, Swaziland, Equatorial Guinea, South Yemen
1970	Fiji, Oman, Tonga
1971	Bahrain, Bangladesh, Qatar, United Arab Emirates
1973	Bahamas
1974	Grenada, Guinea-Bissao, Mozambique
1975	Angola, Cape Verde Islands, Papua New Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Suriname, Comoros
1976	Seychelles
1977	Djibouti
1978	Dominica, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu
1979	Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent
1980	Zimbabwe, Vanuatu
1981	Belize, Antigua and Barbuda
1983	St.Kitts-Nevis
1984	Brunei

Source: Alter 1985:120/121.

But "that nations are considered a natural, God-given way of classifying people - a political destiny laid out in world history, albeit long deferred - is a myth. Nationalism, which sometimes transformed pre-existing cultures into nations, sometimes invents cultures and often destroys cultures that actually exist: this is a reality, good or bad, and in general this reality is inescapable" (Gellner 1991:77). Nationalism, in this view, is an instrument for "crystallizing new entities suited to the conditions now prevailing, even if admittedly using as raw material the cultural, historical, and other heritage of the pre-nationalist world" (Gellner 1991:77). In other words, historically, the emergence of nation-states, i.e., the goal of this kind of nationalism, appears to be a necessary - but, depending on the region, strongly diverging in time - stage of development towards a future world state, whatever this may look like one day. However, there is a striking contradiction between this sociologically and economically rational and plausible development on the one hand and the often irrational behavior of the nationalists on the other. In addition, the new nationalist movements in a large part of the industrially highly developed Western Europe do not fit into this alleged historical logic of development as presented by Gellner. It seems that Gellner's theory of nationalism, while correctly describing individual aspects of traditional nationalist movements, neither explains the "new" nationalism of the late 20th century nor satisfactorily captures the phenomenon of nationalism as such in all its complex reality.

In this context, the geographic-territorial element in the formation of nations is important, but it plays an extremely different role depending on the country. As is well known, most countries have repeatedly changed their borders in the course of their history, depending on political and military constellations. The border shifts between France and Germany are well known, for example. However, shifts in the political, economic and social center of gravity of countries have occurred on various occasions not only on the borders of nation states, but also internally. This phenomenon has been exacerbated by the fact that many nations and nation-states have emerged from more than one center. Even France, which is considered a prime example of the development of a central nation-state with a well-defined core region, had two capitals for a long time in Paris and Orléans. Germany can be considered an extreme example of a nation-state that existed for a long time without a clearly definable center (cf. Deutsch 1972b:32).

In practice, the size of the territory of nation-states differs significantly. For a long time - under the influence of national economics - the opinion prevailed that a "sufficient size" was needed for a nation. However, the ideas of the required territory varied considerably. Garnier-Pagès's 1843 Dictionnaire politique, for example, considered Belgium's and Portugal's claim to be independent nations "ridiculous" because they were obviously too small for it (cf. Hobsbawm 1991:42).

Karl W. Deutsch (1972b:81) underlined the fact that there seems to be something like a "critical size" for the expansion of nation-states: Because the growing size of a state is also accompanied by an increasing political self-centeredness of the politically active population, elites and rulers are also increasingly burdened by domestic tensions, prejudices, and wishful thinking in their foreign policy. The larger the domestic political network and the more diverse the country's internal communication processes and interests, the less willing they are to address the concerns and wishes of smaller second states. As a result, the understanding of their concerns also decreases. It seems that this thesis can be easily confirmed by the example of the USA. One thinks, for example, of U.S. policy toward South and Central American states up to the recent past.

Throughout history, attempts have been made to reconcile state borders with nationality and language borders. Almost every such attempt led to immense suffering of the affected population, to new ethnic-national conflicts and not infrequently to major wars. The peace order after 1918 was also based on this principle, among others (cf. Hobsbawm 1991:157/158). Thus, the interwar period saw mass expulsions or even exterminations of ethnic minorities. Hitler's mass murder of Jews, Roma and Sinti was only the final consequence of this absurd nationalist policy of creating ethnically homogeneous territorial nations.

The Swiss historian Josef Lang (in Neue Wege, February 1992) once distinguished two types of nation-states with regard to the assertiveness of fascism: "In states formed as a result of civil upheavals or social revolutions, such as the United States, Holland, France and Switzerland, fascism was not capable of gaining a majority in the 20th century. In contrast, where the state formed the nation, as in Germany, Italy, Spain, and Japan, fascism was capable of a majority in the 20th century." This typologization is worth considering. However, the question must be

asked whether ideal types are not being compared here that were never to be found in reality. As is well known, Italy was formed in 1861 as a result of a democratic movement, while the formation of states in the United States, in my opinion, was not only the result of democratic revolutions and civil society awakenings. A certain idealization and romanticization of the USA seems to be at play here, which for centuries was nothing but a rather brutal settler society of European immigrants (in the East) and an occupation society of their descendants (in the West) against the Native Americans.

The emergence of nation-states was expressed, among other things, in international law, which to this day is not a law of nations but a law of states (Kimminich 1985:182). Because international law is based on the general doctrine of states, people and nation are used synonymously there. That is why collective rights were considered to be rights of the state until recent times. But if the state "is, so to speak, the legal expression, the legal 'housing' of the nation" - as Kimminich (1985:182) says - then the disastrous consequences of such an understanding of rights can only be guessed at for all those who for some reason lose their citizenship or have to flee from "their" state. For this reason, among others, and because the congruence of nation and state in the sense of the nationality principle ("every nation a state, every state a national being," cf. Kimminich 1985:183) postulated for a long time by constitutional jurisprudence has become more and more problematic, today especially the Anglo-Saxon literature speaks of "sovereign state" (cf. Kimminich 1985:183).

According to Aalberts (2012:37), the following types of sovereignty are distinguished today: legal sovereignty - that is, authority and rule by virtue of law and constitution - and de facto internal sovereignty in the sense of political control (as a capacity). Later, the use of "domestic sovereignty" and "interdependence sovereignty" has prevailed (see Aalberts 2012:37).

Without a doubt, the role and function of nation-states has changed in recent decades: On the one hand, the global economy has become increasingly state-independent -at least in the highly developed countries. On the other hand, in addition to its monopoly of power - which, by the way, is being increasingly eroded by the growing number of regional or continental mergers - the nation state has taken on significant social tasks. These will hardly ever be covered by any

private institution - quite simply because poverty, social misery and need cannot be combated in an economically profitable way.

2.2   Limits of nation states

Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of December 16, 1966 reads:

"1)   All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of this right they freely determine their political status and freely shape their economic, social and cultural development.

2)   All peoples shall be free to dispose of their natural wealth and resources for their own ends, without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic cooperation based on the mutual good and out of international law. In no case shall a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence" (quoted from Galtung 2012:194).

Richard Falk (1995:166/167) argued that since World War II, but especially since the fall of communism in 1989, there has been an "erosion of territoriality." This had also led to an undermining of inter-state law. According to Falk (1995:167), this erosion of territoriality can be described from three points of view:

- Vulnerability: the state has lost the ability to maintain security in the era of nuclear weapons and long-range weapons systems;

- Outside influences: The state could not prevent global or regional developments - such as environmental problems, climate change, etc. - from influencing it;

- Loss of economic autonomy: The longer the state remains subject to global economic influences (global labor market, global trade, global economy, etc.), the more it is affected.

As a result, the national state is increasingly losing its operational capacity to act.

In contrast, David Held (1999:97) emphasized that nation-states continue to be immensely powerful and have access to an enormous breadth of resources, even against the backdrop

of a globalized world. Still, nation-states had great bureaucratic and infrastructural capabilities as well as far-reaching technologies for coordination and control (cf. Held 1999:97). However, Held (1999:98) also concedes that the autonomy of democratically elected governments has been and is increasingly constrained by unelected and unrepresentative economic power. Accordingly, he argues, there is an increasing divergence between the idea of a democratic state as an independent center of power within clearly defined (territorial and non-territorial) boundaries and interrelated changes in media and cultural exchange. Not only these challenges, but also more and more transnational problems such as environmental pollution, climate change, etc. limit the possibilities of action of nation states and their governments. Furthermore, changes and new developments in international law have become increasingly important for individuals, companies, governments and non-governmental organizations, subjecting them to new regulatory systems (cf. Held 1999:100/101). Held (1999:103-104) drew five conclusions from this: First, effective political power can be exercised less and less by national governments. Second, the idea of a political community and political self-determination can be realized less and less within the borders of a single nation-state. Third, there is an ever-widening gap between formal (national) state authorities and the current political and economic rules of the game at the regional and global levels. Fourth, there are more and more overlapping loyalties and conflicting interpretations of rights and obligations of interconnected legal and governmental structures. Fifth, since the late 20th century, there has been a series of border problems of a new type: Because transnational actors and international corporations increasingly cross national borders, the question arises as to who is responsible to whom. Overlapping spheres of influence, interference, and conflicts of interest-which only partially follow national boundaries-create fundamental problems of democratic self-government and governance (cf. Held 1999:104). Accordingly, Held (1999:104) rightly demands that democracy be rethought from the ground up in the context of globalization.

Based on this, the following questions arise according to Held (1999:105):

- How should constitutional boundaries be drawn?

- How should representative representation be organized (who represents whom on what basis)?

-        What forms and what goals of political participation are appropriate today? (On the question of modern democratic organization, cf. ► Unit E 17: "Democracy as a permanent solution or a brief episode in history?")

In connection with nation-states, there is a fundamental problem that is often overlooked. (National) state sovereignty not only protects the rights of those individuals against external appropriation and interference who live in liberal and democratic states, but also protects those states that deprive their citizens of basic freedoms and rights, or even torture, expel, drive to forced conversion, or kill them (cf. Schimmelfennig 2013:34).

Another problem today is the protection and guarantee of individual freedoms and rights beyond state borders, such as for people living or temporarily residing abroad. This involves fundamental rights, such as economic freedom, questions of immigration and settlement, the right to asylum, and questions of family reunification (cf. Schimmelfennig 2013:34/35). The fact that many people cannot imagine rights and obligations outside the national framework does not change this problem - which is likely to become increasingly virulent in the future.

In addition, even legal agreements between democratic states and cooperation in international organizations often come "at the expense of domestic political control and participation" (Schimmelfennig 2013:35). Increasingly, international cooperation means loss of democratic control, as demonstrated, for example, by the negotiations surrounding the TTIP agreement (=Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, cf. http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/index_de.htm), which took place with the public completely excluded. This has not escaped the attention of populist politicians. The fact that the newly elected U.S. President Donald Trump put the negotiations on a Trans-Pacific Free Trade Area (Transpacific Trade Partnership = TTP) on ice at the beginning of 2017 (cf. Müller in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 25.1.2017:335) fits in with his nationalistic "America-first" policy.

2.3   Competition between nation states

Today, all nation states are engaged in fierce location competition for investment, jobs, tax revenues and - last but not least - quality of life (cf. Koch 2014:83). Other location factors are legal certainty, social partnership and the lowest possible level of social or, better, institutionally cushioned conflicts.

New tasks of the nation states
"In order to avoid ruinous competition on the one hand, but at the same time to make full use of the new opportunities arising from globalization, and finally to take into account the emergence of overriding common interests, the principle and practice of international cooperation takes on a new significance. Increasingly, new political solutions and their implementation can only be implemented in cooperation with other states or delegated to international bodies. In this context, states must take on new tasks that arise for them in particular from their involvement in multilateral or regional cooperation and decision-making mechanisms."
Source: Koch 2014:115.

However, according to Koch (2014:116), the thesis of the loss of autonomy of nation-states due to globalization only partially corresponds to reality. Koch (2014:116) believes that even smaller nation states can pursue a successful national location policy. Thus, they can "prevent an outflow of physical and financial capital ... by means of suitable bundles of measures, or direct the capital flowing out of other countries to themselves. As a rule, however, the prerequisite for the effectiveness of such policy models is, among other things, a reliable and transparent political framework" (Koch 2014:116). Here, however, it must be objected that the latest negotiations on transnational agreements such as the Investment Protection Treaty or the Transatlantic Free Trade Area between the US and the EU (NAFT) are rather characterized by the opposite: Secrecy, unpublished draft agreements, shuffling and lack of transparency characterize the latest developments.

The fact remains that "the nation-state, however, ... still [remains] the most important, democratically legitimized body charged with looking after the interests of its citizens" (Koch 2014:117).

3.   Control Questions

1.   According to Jellinek, what are the three elements of a state?

2.   Name the six core functions of the state according to Debiel.

3.   What condition was necessary to create a state according to Francis?

4.   What did "nation" originally mean in the english language?

5.   Where did the German term nation first appear?

6.   Why does Heckmann call the concept of an ethnically homogeneous nation a myth of the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries?

7.   Which eight developmental steps did Karl W. Deutsch name in relation to the emergence of nations?

8.   According to Deutsch, when did common and unifying economic factors not lead to the formation of common nations?

9.   According to Gellner, what conditions had to be met for nations and nation-states to develop?

10.   Which two types of sovereignty are distinguished today?

11.   Benedict Anderson calls nations "imagined communities". What is meant by this?

12.   What do you think about the idea that nation states should be limited in size and number (population)?

13.   According to Falk, which three developments lead to an "erosion of territoriality" of states?

14.   To what extent do globalization and economic (world) development influence nation-states?

15.   Which five effects of the latest international developments does Held see for the nation states?

16.   In which areas are nation-states increasingly subject to competition?

4.   Links

Nationalstaat – Definition
https://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/lexika/politiklexikon/17894/nationalstaat

Nationalstaat – Definitionen
https://www.dwds.de/wb/Nationalstaat

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