

Unit V 40: Right to migrate and right to settle freely as human rights

1. Summary

Although international migration has increased in recent years and will continue to do so, this development has so far hardly led to changes in the exercise - or in the case of migrants: the denial - of civil rights, despite the increasingly transnational habitats of migrants. The resulting discrimination can only be overcome by a globally guaranteed right to migrate and settle.

2. Overview of international migration

Between 1960 and 2005, international migration developed differently depending on the world region, but everywhere with an upward trend:

Table 1.1 *Number of international migrants by region: 1960–2005, millions*

<i>Region</i>	<i>1960</i>	<i>1970</i>	<i>1980</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>2005</i>
World	76.	81	99	155	177	191
More developed regions	32	38	48	82	105	115
Less developed regions	43	43	52	73	72	75
Africa	9	10	14	16	17	17
Asia	29	28	32	50	50	53
Europe	14	19	22	49	58	64
Latin America and Caribbean	6	6	6	7	6	7
North America	13	13	18	28	40	45
Oceania	2	3	4	5	5	5

Note: the UN defines migrants as persons who have lived outside their country of birth for 12 months or over.

Source: (UNDESA, 2005).

Source: Castles/Miller 2009:5.

In 2005, the resident population of the world's major regions was made up of a not inconsiderable proportion of international migrants, as follows

- in Oceania: 15%;
- in North America: 13%;

- in Europe: 9%;
- in Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean: 2% (Spring 2009:179).

At the same time, immigrants are distributed very unevenly across countries.

Henry Teune (2008:229) has rightly pointed out that recent developments in individual states and in the relationship between them - not least in view of increasing globalization - have led to a loosening of the hitherto close relationship between territoriality and citizenship: „The relative weakening of the concept of territory as a normative principle enacted by group pressures and state hierarchies allows novel, competing associational and organizational claims to emerge. With global development, states become intermediaries between the local and the global“ (Teune 2008:229).

Thus, while on the one hand migrants spend a large part of their lives in the country of immigration, work there, contribute to the gross domestic product and pay taxes, on the other hand they have no opportunity to participate in the political process and have a say in shaping their living space because of the lack of voting rights.

For this reason, among others, there is an increasing loosening of territoriality from civil rights. One of the most important means of counteracting this trend, namely naturalization in the country of immigration, remains at a low level in most countries, with a few exceptions such as Sweden and the Netherlands. As the following table shows, the number of migrants who acquired citizenship in the country of immigration increased only slightly from 1988 to 2005:

Table 11.2 *Acquisition of nationality in selected OECD countries (1988, 1995 and 2005)*

Country	Acquisition of nationality 1988		Acquisition of nationality 1995		Acquisition of nationality 2005	
	Thousands	Rate per cent	Thousands	Rate per cent	Thousands	Rate per cent
Australia	81	n.a.	115	n.a.	93	n.a.
Belgium	8	1.0	26	2.8	32	3.5
Canada	59	n.a.	228	n.a.	196	n.a.
Czech Rep.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	3	0.9
France	46	1.3	n.a.	n.a.	155	4.8*
Germany	17	0.4	72	1.0	117	1.6
Italy	12	1.2	7	1.1	12**	0.5**
Japan	6	0.6	14	1.0	15	0.8
Netherlands	9	1.4	71	9.4	28	4.1
Spain	n.a.	n.a.	7	1.5	43	2.2
Sweden	18	4.3	32	6.0	40	8.2
Switzerland	11	1.1	17	1.3	38	2.6
UK	65	3.5	41	2.0	162	5.7
USA	242	n.a.	488	n.a.	604	n.a.
EU25	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	687	n.a.

Notes: Statistics cover all means of acquiring the nationality of a country.

The acquisition rate gives the number of persons acquiring the nationality of a country as a percentage of the stock of the foreign population at the beginning of the year.

n.a., data is not available.

* The 2005 rate for France is a rough estimate based on the 1999 foreign population figure.

** 2004 figures for Italy.

Sources: For 1988: own calculations based on OECD (1997). For 1995 and 2005: OECD (2006: Table A.1.6; 2007: Table A.1.6.).

Source: Castles/Miller 2009:270.

Migrants perform an astonishing amount of integration work in the country of immigration. However, experience shows that these achievements are often not or hardly recognized in the country of immigration. This is evident at the economic, political, and cultural levels. Larry A. Sjaastad (2014:12) has asked the question whether migrants bear all the costs of migration and, conversely, receive all the rewards of migration. And his answer was: most likely not. On the one hand, migrants impose costs on non-migrants in both the country of emigration and the country of immigration; on the other hand, non-migrants benefit from migration in both the country of origin and the receiving country. In this context, how the costs and returns of migration are distributed between native and immigrant populations is often a matter of political distributional struggle.

In her extensive research on the situation of second-generation migrants in terms of education, labor market, and partnerships, Gunilla Fincke (2008:228-230) arrived at the following summary findings:

- "1. Second-generation migrants attain on average a higher socioeconomic status than first- and one-and-a-half-generation migrants and enter into fewer co-ethnic partnerships. This finding holds for all origin groups except for Western migrants from non-recruit countries. Western migrants are therefore the only group affected by the 'decline' of the second generation described in the media and some academic reports - albeit at a high level.
2. The differences between ethnic groups are large, with the Turkish origin group consistently achieving the lowest status. However, the children of ex-Yugoslavs are often not far from these results. Moreover, the differences between origin groups narrow in the second generation: for example, 31% of Turkish migrants of the first and one-and-a-half generations achieve only the lowest level of education, whereas this percentage is 10% for migrants of Italian origin and 13% for those of Greek origin. In the second generation, however, the difference shrinks to a single percentage point (5% compared to 4% for both persons of Italian and Greek origin).
3. Inter-ethnic diversity is complemented by significant intra-ethnic variance: The dispersion of mean values within the groups of origin is not significantly lower than among non-migrants. Homogenizing statements about "the Turks," for example, must therefore be viewed with skepticism. Where ten years ago integration research was about the recognition of difference ('migrants have specific problems and resources due to their migration experience'), today it is about emphasizing the multiplication of differences within the groups of the second generation of migrants ('the problems and opportunities for this group are different and broken along non-migration-specific factors'). A truncated equation of migrants with Muslims and especially with migrants of Turkish origin who belong to the lower class must be rejected.
4. Migrants with German citizenship are more similar to Germans without a migration background in terms of educational qualifications and the prestige of their professions than migrants with foreign citizenship. The restriction in German migration research to 'foreigners', which was common until recently, therefore distorts the empirical results negatively. This unfavorable bias is reinforced by the exclusion of the children of Aussiedler*innen in empirical studies, since Aussiedler*innen in the second generation occupy on average higher socio-structural

- positions than most other migrant groups. An exception to this finding is the group of Western migrants from non-recipient countries. Migrants with a high socioeconomic status are less likely to acquire German citizenship, so that foreign citizens among these migrants have higher ISCED, Blossfeld and MPS scores than naturalized citizens.
5. The widespread stereotype of poorly placed (female) migrants could not be confirmed for the second generation. In education, for example, second-generation (female) migrants from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia lagged a little behind the average results of male migrants, but women of Italian, Greek, Spanish and Portuguese origin achieved roughly the same results as men.
 6. When integration patterns are examined at the individual level, it becomes apparent that non-precarious socioeconomic status and cultural adaptation do not always coincide. Between 2% to 18% combine a secure socioeconomic positioning with a pluralistic orientation (measured by a relationship with a first-generation co-ethnic partner). At the same time, there exists a group for whom an orientation to the cultural 'mainstream' (also captured through partnership) coincides with a precarious socioeconomic status" (Fincke 2008:228-230).

One of the most glaring inequalities in the age of neo-liberal globalization is the different treatment of goods, services and capital on the one hand and of people on the other. While capital can circulate freely around the globe and more and more trade barriers for goods and services are being systematically dismantled through global agreements, e.g. within the framework of the WTO, people still cannot move freely around the globe. State repression, police and sometimes even army are used to inhibit people from circulating freely and to deny them entry to many countries. The rich countries are afraid of losing their advantageous living conditions, while elsewhere millions of people are forced by wars, environmental destruction, climate change, political unrest or poverty to vegetate under the saddest of living conditions.

Basically, the rich immigration countries do not care about the legitimate wish of millions of people to find decent living conditions elsewhere. Only when it serves their interests - e.g. when they need additional qualified workers - do highly developed countries open their

borders to people from other countries and continents, and even then only extremely selectively and purposefully.

I believe that every person living on this planet must have a fundamental right to free migration and free settlement - and associated with that access to all civil rights such as voting and election rights wherever they live. By the way, the worldwide unrestricted right to free settlement is not a new demand. For example, Silvio Gesell (1984:92, quoted from Bichlmaier 2009:382) called for a right of settlement for all people everywhere in the world more than 90 years ago.

The illegalization and criminalization of entire groups of people through immigration and asylum procedures with all the manifold repression, deportation and forced return practices contradict the spirit of human rights and human dignity.

The fact that, for example, detention pending deportation for asylum seekers who have entered the country illegally can violate human rights was also noted by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court in 2017. In May 2017, it upheld the appeal of an Afghan couple who had entered Switzerland illegally from Norway via Germany in May 2016, accompanied by three small children, with the wife heavily pregnant at the time of entry. The man was placed in deportation custody, the three older children were placed in a children's home by order of the Child and Adult Protection Authority (KESB), and the wife was housed with the newborn in the Zurich airport prison. The Federal Court criticized the Canton of Zurich for the way it had dealt with the family. By separating the children from their spouses, the enforcement canton had violated the European Convention on Human Rights and violated the right to family life guaranteed therein (see Fontana in *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 17.5.2017:14).

Especially in the area of asylum and among the Sans-Papiers there are great grievances. Here are a few figures from Switzerland: According to a study by the Federal Commission for Migration Issues (2010), an estimated 70,000 to 300,000 people live in Switzerland without a valid residence permit. These "illegals" or "sans papiers" are not a homogeneous group. They include tourists and short-term residents who remained in Switzerland after their residence permit expired, people whose annual residence permit was not renewed, e.g.

because they lost their job or their apartment was terminated, settled persons (C residence permit) who lost their right to settle, for example as a result of job loss or divorce. In addition, there are irregular entrants or asylum seekers who have not left the country after a negative asylum decision. As a rule, the loss of legal residence status is associated with a precarization of the working and living situation: No - at least regular - job, underpaid undeclared work, homelessness or precarious housing situation, permanent fear of "getting caught", etc. Economically, this means that the Sans-Papiers represent a kind of "industrial reserve army" (Karl Marx), without rights and who can be drawn upon at will when needed. These people are forced to sell their labor at dumping prices in order to survive. There is also a gray area: If, for example, Polish or Slovakian private caregivers for wealthier elderly people are available for a full-time job with mandatory accommodation with the elderly person around the clock, and receive € 1300.- or Fr. 1500.- per month, with a time limit of 4 months, and the agency in their country of origin receives as much again, then this arrangement is in the gray area. The caregivers in question have hardly any rights and are completely dependent on their agency.

Ultimately, the great global injustice between poor and privileged people can only be effectively and sustainably addressed if every person is granted and guaranteed a globally valid right to migrate and settle. In conjunction with this, all civil rights must be granted, regardless of the current place of residence, so that locally, nationally and worldwide every person can participate in political and economic events.

I am of the opinion that **worldwide freedom of migration and settlement**, but also the globally **valid granting of voting and electoral rights at the respective place of residence** must be included in human rights and enforced worldwide. In the long term, there is no way around this.

2.1 On international migration

Migration as a phenomenon is neither new nor limited to individual countries.

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
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Between 1871 and 1915, for example, 36 million people emigrated from Europe, mainly to North and South America (cf. James 2005:34). For the countries of immigration, this flow of immigrants brought considerable economic growth. At the same time, emigration led to a reduction in poverty in some emigration countries, such as Ireland. Interestingly, emigration countries also experienced large productivity gains as part of the population surplus - which could not be absorbed by labor markets due to a lack of jobs - disappeared. In this sense, both emigration countries and immigration countries benefited from migration.

But how did migration flows and migration routes develop and change? The following three maps show the shift in migratory movements over time:

From the 17th to the 19th century, migration movements were as follows:

Map 4.1 Colonial migrations from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries



Note: The arrow dimensions give an approximate indication of the volume of flows. Exact figures are often unavailable.

Source: Castles/Miller 2009:81.


After World War II until the oil shock of the 1970s, international migration - especially in the form of labor migration - was concentrated in Europe:

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Map 5.1 Global migrations, 1945–1973




Note: The arrow dimensions give an approximate indication of the volume of flows. Exact figures are often unavailable.

Source: Castles/Miller 2009:98.

In the period from 1973 to the end of the 20th century, migration increased to the Middle East and - in the Western Hemisphere - to North America. In addition, there were increased migration movements in West Africa and southern Africa, as well as to Japan.

Map 1.1 Global migratory movements from 1973




Note: The arrow dimensions give an approximate indication of the volume of flows. Exact figure are often unavailable.

Source: Castles/Miller 2009: 6.

In the course of time, migration took on very different forms; in some cases it took place illegally, i.e. against the will of the countries of immigration.

For the migrants, the question of whether migration took place in a legalized form or illegally, i.e. without corresponding state regulation or even against certain state requirements, was of decisive importance. In most cases, state regulations - despite repeated attempts - could not control migration, but only create more or less optimal conditions for it, i.e. either legalize or illegalize migration or even criminalize it.

Friedrich Heckmann (2008:288) named three forms of illegal migration:



With regard to Great Britain, Castles/Miller (2009:306) named four mechanisms in particular that turn "legal" migrants into "undesirable," "irregular," and ultimately illegal migrants:

- Persons with correct papers who enter illegally or cross the border,
- legal entrants who stay after their entry visa expires or who work without a work permit,
- family members of migrant workers who are prohibited from legal entry,
- asylum seekers who are not recognized as refugees.

2.2 International regulatory attempts

According to Westermann (2009:77), special and forward-looking cooperation on migration is taking place within the framework of the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) established by the UN General Secretariat. The GCIM is to make recommendations on how to "strengthen governance at the regional, national and global levels in the area of

migration" (Westermann 2009:77). To this end, the commission should initiate a global debate on migration, involving all relevant actors. In its first report in 2005, the Commission called for, among other things,

- greater involvement of civil society actors in regional consultation processes,
- coherent migration policies at the national level in line with international norms,
- greater support by nation-states for policy formulation initiated by the international community through resources, expertise and training,
- Establishment of an advisory group.

The "United Nations Convention against Transnational Crime" contains three additional protocols in its annex, including the "Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air", also known as the Palermo Protocol. The objectives of this protocol are, first, to prevent and combat human smuggling, second, to promote cooperation between the signatory states, and third, to protect the rights of migrants (cf. Westermann 2009:78). Without going into the details here, we can say that at least the first and third objectives, namely stopping people smuggling and protecting the rights of migrants, are largely unachieved.

As one of the reasons why migration management is so difficult, Westermann (2009:147) correctly cites the fact "that migration management touches core elements of national sovereignty."

These and many other measures at the nation-state level have very limited effectiveness. Reactive state measures aim to stop, avert, or at least control migration movements. However, according to Westermann (2009:155), "the reactive measures ... [stop migration flows] nor eliminate the causes of migration. Therein lies their limitations" According to Westermann, "repressive measures ... while indispensable, are not sufficient in the long run under increasing migratory pressure." Westermann (2009:156) therefore calls for combating the causes of migration, including structural reforms in the economic sphere, debt relief strategies, the creation and expansion of jobs and educational opportunities in emigration countries, and better medical care.

In my opinion, however, the impact of such policies on migration is questionable for two reasons: On the one hand, it is unrealistic to expect or implement such structural changes in emigration countries in a short time. On the other hand, it is not certain that these structural changes would be sufficient to stop migration.

A far more pragmatic path has been taken by a number of immigration countries in Europe: More and more states recognized the dual citizenship of migrants: On the one hand, these people are citizens of their country of origin and, increasingly, naturalized citizens in the country of immigration. Switzerland, for example, has long recognized dual citizenship. Faist, Gerdes and Rieple (2008:101) see the spread of dual citizenship on the one hand as a precursor of cosmopolitan citizenship and on the other hand as an extension of human rights: "In sum, the evidence suggests that dual citizenship is not simply a foreboding of cosmopolitan citizenship. The main trend has been the spread of dual nationality and the tolerance toward dual citizenship as a result of an emerging trend of nationality as a human right" (Faist/Gerdes/Rieple 2008:101). James Hollifield (2008:78) also sees a strengthening of the position of individuals vis-à-vis the state in the form of the pragmatic granting of citizenship rights based on the constitutions of the host countries and on human rights considerations. This has enabled migrants to acquire "a kind of international legal personality," leading to a reinforcement of "transnational law" or even a kind of "transnational citizenship."

However, in the context of Erdogan's 2017 referendum on the new constitution in Turkey, dual citizenship has come under heavy criticism. In particular, conservative and right-wing populist circles in Germany and Switzerland want to curtail the dual citizenship rights of Turks. Moreover, some see dual nationality as a preference for migrants over citizens with only one nationality.

Be that as it may: It would probably make more sense to abandon state attempts at control by means of repression in the immigration countries and instead to allow migration to take place freely worldwide. After an initial phase of increased immigration to rich countries, their attractiveness for immigrants will automatically diminish after some time, at the latest when the labor market in the countries concerned is saturated.

Such an arrangement makes even more sense if Gregory Feldman's (2015:5) bon mot is true: "We are all migrants." Given the all-encompassing mobility today and the large and small migration periods in history, there is some evidence that this is increasingly true.

Reiner Eichenberger, professor of finance and economic policy at the University of Fribourg, has brought a possibility of controlling migration to the discussion that is worth considering: he proposed the introduction of an immigration levy for employed and non-employed persons that would depend on the time spent in the country of immigration. This would return the greater costs caused by immigration to the general public (cf. Eichenberger in Schweizerische Handelszeitung, 17.9.2015:4). Eichenberger said that this levy could also be imposed on short-term residents and cross-border commuters. The levy would be justified by the fact that immigrants achieved an annual financing advantage of 4600 francs in taxes and duties, which could be compensated by an immigration levy of this amount.

However, it should be borne in mind that the financing advantage varies greatly depending on the wage segment - e.g. it is significantly lower for employees in the low-wage segment. In addition, it is actually the employers who benefit from immigration, which is why it would be the entrepreneurs who would have to pay a corresponding levy rather than the employees. But then the labor factor would become more expensive again, which would make outsourcing production abroad even more attractive - which is rather disadvantageous from an economic point of view.

Does this leave only the alternative of opening borders or sealing them off?

Stephen Castles (2008:50) puts forward the following arguments against unconditional border opening for migrants:

- **Plundering the scarce human capital of poor countries:** As already shown by the extensive liberalization of migration in the segment of highly skilled labor in some immigration countries, poor countries lose a large part of their highly educated labor force through migration. Therefore, according to Castles (2008:50), stronger regulation rather than liberalization of migration is appropriate.

- **Competition for local labor:** Employers, according to Castles (2008:50), often encourage uncontrolled immigration because they can pay immigrants lower wages compared to local workers.
- **Saturated labor markets in highly developed countries:** According to Castles (2008:50), the labor markets of immigrant countries can absorb only a very small fraction of the nonemployed and underemployed workers of the South. Therefore, this does not lead to a remarkable improvement of the wage situation in the countries of origin.
- **Increase of racism and xenophobia:** Because of the increasing wage pressure and because of the anti-immigration campaigns of the media, unrestricted immigration would lead to increased racism and growing violence against immigrants, as well as to a strengthening of right-wing extremist parties and groups.
- **Elimination of the distinction between refugees and migrants for economic reasons:** This would render the right to asylum useless and could cause many vulnerable people in the South to lose their protection.
- **Anarchic situation:** According to Castles (2008:50), an anarchic situation would arise and the weakest, namely the countries of emigration, would be even more disadvantaged.

Here's what I have to say about that:

- As Castles himself writes, the **brain drain** from poor to rich countries already exists today - because employers have always managed to let enough highly skilled workers immigrate. Today, labor markets largely follow the rules of employers, largely to the disadvantage of workers. Open borders would give job seekers more opportunities and rights.
- **Wage competition for domestic workers** is indeed a problem. However, as the example of the Swiss policy on foreigners after the Second World War showed, it is very well possible to enforce the same wages for all - i.e. native and immigrant workers - either by means of statutory minimum wages or by means of collective labor agreements that have a quasi-legal character. Moreover, worldwide minimum wages would have been enforced long ago, if the trade unions would fulfill their -

internationalist - task and not cement nationalistic advantages for the respective native workforce.

- Either way, the problem of **labor market saturation** in host countries exists, except that under the current regime, foreign job seekers are illegalized and even criminalized.
- Studies have shown that **racism and xenophobia** are not the result of a high proportion of foreigners - otherwise racism in Switzerland would have to be three times as widespread as in Germany - but a matter of perception and political climate.
- The **distinction between migrants for economic reasons and refugees** was called into question years ago in Switzerland and elsewhere. This is partly because these legal distinctions are becoming increasingly blurred in reality - and because the distinction is not always so clear. More than 20 years ago, for example, Peter Arbenz called for a uniform migration policy instead of separate policies on asylum and foreigners.
- And finally, the current system has long since created an **anarchic climate** for those affected with regard to their legal situation, be it the Sans Papiers, the illegal immigrants who die by the hundreds at Europe's borders, or the victims of trafficking in women who are systematically driven into prostitution.

If, in addition to freeing up migration, minimum wages could be introduced worldwide, the main cause of migration, namely the rock-bottom wages in the emigration countries, should definitely disappear.

The decisive factor here is how the migrants themselves see the matter. Thus, at the beginning of February 2015 in Bern, the participants at the first congress for migrants and people with a migration background made four short-term demands:

- The maintenance of the free movement of persons with the EU,
- The regularization of the residence status of all Sans-Papiers living in Switzerland,
- The prohibition of deportation abroad of people who have their center of life in Switzerland, and
- Immediate admission of 100,000 Syrian refugees in Switzerland (cf. WochenZeitung, 12.2.2015a:5).

2.3 The Problem of Internal Migration

When one talks about migration, one usually thinks of people moving from one country to another. At least as important and no less complex in its effects is internal migration, that is, migration within the same country. In the Regle, people move from the country to the city, where they hope to find better living conditions - but not always rightly so.

According to Hernando de Soto (1992:39), for example, today's Lima, a city of over a million inhabitants, would have had just 1.445 million inhabitants in 1981 instead of 4 million if it had not been for immigration since 1940.

According to de Soto (1992:39), a major reason for internal migration is the expanded transportation routes: At the beginning of the 20th century, for example, there were just 4000 kilometers of roads in Peru; by 1981, there were 60,000 kilometers.

In most countries today, between 50 and 66% of the population live in cities or agglomerations; 150 to 200 years ago, most people lived in rural areas - it is estimated that between 75 and 85% lived there. In Peru, for example, the rural population made up 85% of the total population in 1700; by 1876, it was still 80%. In 1940, 65% of Peru's population lived in rural areas; in 1981, it was just 35% (de Soto 1992:38).

Very rightly, Hernando de Soto (1992:41) has pointed out that internal migration "is not an irrational, arbitrary or instinctive movement (much less something like a herd instinct...), but rather a well-considered act based on a very rational assessment of the respective prospects of rural and urban life." This is just as true for cross-border migration.

3. Control questions

1. To what extent is there a contradiction between increasing international migration and nationally defined civil rights?
2. What are the results of research on second-generation migrants in Germany?

3. Why should a worldwide right to migration and settlement be guaranteed?
4. Which were the most important migration routes in the period from the 17th to the 19th century?
5. What was the main focus of migration between 1945 and 1973?
6. Describe the main migration routes and destinations after 1973.
7. What are the three main forms of illegal immigration according to Heckmann?
8. Which four demands concerning migration were made by the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) in 2005?
9. Why is it so difficult for nation states to manage migration? 10.
10. What are the advantages and disadvantages of Eichenberger's proposal to levy an immigration tax on immigrants?
11. Which six arguments did Castles use against an unconditional opening of borders for migrants?
12. Which six counter-arguments can be used against Castles' argumentation against opening the borders?

4. Links

Staatssekretariat für Migration (Schweiz)

<https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/de/home.html>

Statistik Migration und Integration in der Schweiz

<https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/bevoelkerung/migration-integration.html>

Swiss Migration News

<https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-29168.html>

Migration Online des DGB (Deutschland)

<http://www.migration-online.de/>

Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Deutschland): Migration nach Deutschland

<http://www.bamf.de/>

Migrationsplattform der österreichischen Bundesregierung

<http://www.migration.gv.at/>

Nationaler Kontaktpunkt Österreich im Europäischen Migrationsnetzwerk
<http://www.emn.at/>

Immigrierte Bevölkerung in Österreich
http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/bevoelkerung/bevoelkerungsstruktur/bevoelkerung_nach_migrationshintergrund/

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